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Abstract
Types of discrimination are usually distinguished by economic theory in statistical
and taste-based. Using a correspondence experiment, we analyze which of the two
affects Italian labor market the most. In this respect, we studied the difference in
discrimination reserved to first- and second-generation immigrants, taking gender
differences into account. Even if we want to admit a rational discrimination based on
perceived productivity differences (statistical discrimination) against first-generation
immigrants (concerning language and education gaps), the same would not be
reasonable for second-generation ones. Since they are born and educated in Italy,
where they have always lived, the associated discrimination must be taste-based.
Keywords: Labor market discrimination, First- and second-generation immigrants,
Statistical and taste-based discrimination, Experimental economics, Net discrimination
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Introduction
According to Arrow (1973), reasons for discrimination can be analyzed from an
economic perspective. When a firm discriminates in the hiring process, a positive or
negative value is basically assigned to certain characteristics, even if such characteris-
tics are not directly linked to employee productivity.
The US National Research Council defines racial or ethnic discrimination focusing
on “differential treatment on the basis of race that disadvantages a racial group, and
treatment on the basis of inadequately justified factors other than race that disadvan-
tages a racial group” (Blank et al. 2004). The United Nations define gender discrimin-
ation as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil, or any other field” (UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women—Article 1).
Types of discrimination are usually distinguished by economic theory in statistical
and taste-based. The former occurs when the judgment of an individual depends on
group characteristics rather than the individuals. The latter occurs, instead, when a
group of individuals (either employers or customers) prefer a certain group over
another, based on tastes, rather than any economic rationale (see e.g., Lahey 2008 for a
Genus
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review of this literature). The second case includes xenophobia and racism, but also
different kinds of personal preferences, the common point being that an employer
discriminates against a group of individuals irrespective of the other information he/she
has about the candidate (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
In this way, the recruiter does not act in a profit-maximizing manner, but “an avoid-
ance of the psychic cost of contact with the ‘wrong’ race [...] takes precedence” (Riach
and Rich 1991, p. 247). Consequently, employers not actualizing racial or gender pref-
erences gain a competitive advantage with respect to the ones actualizing them
(Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
By contrast, in the case of statistical discrimination, ethnicity acts as a proxy for
unobserved information, and members of a specific group are discriminated because
employer lacks information (Arrow 1972; Phelps 1972). According to human capital
theory, members of minority groups are usually “statistically” characterized by lower
human capital compared to majority competitors (Andriessen et al. 2008). This is
because they are on average less educated, unfamiliar with host-country institutions
and not sufficiently fluent in the language (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
For this reason, even if employers will not always hire the most qualified applicant,
statistical discrimination is considered as an acceptable trade-off not to pay the neces-
sary increase in the cost of recruiting to get all the relevant information (Bursell 2007).
While statistical discrimination is usually considered to be efficient in the case of
imperfect information (Arrow 1973), taste-based discrimination is inefficient in any
case in terms of overall social welfare (Becker 1971).
The aim of this study is to analyze ethnic and gender discrimination in the Italian
labor market, distinguishing between their statistical and taste-based components. To
measure which part of discrimination is connected to statistical and which to taste-
based reasons, we used the difference in discrimination between first- and second-
generation candidates.
Italy is particularly relevant as case study because it is a growing immigration coun-
try, experiencing for the first time a massive amount of second-generation and Italian-
naturalized individuals; the migratory inflow has seen an enormous escalation since
2001 (Fullin and Reyneri 2011), making Italy the second country in Europe for number
of immigrants received in the last 20 years (Fullin 2016). We defined first-generation
immigrants as the ones who were born abroad and are now living in Italy (all in Rome
city center); second-generation immigrants were born in Rome from foreign parents,
and they studied in Italy, but they do not have Italian nationality.
Our idea is the following: While first-generation immigrants are individuals who were
born and educated in their country of origin, second-generation ones are individuals
who were born and educated in Italy. For these reasons, while discrimination against
the first generation of immigrants may be driven by reasons related to real differences
in productivity (e.g., either linguistic or competence gaps, related to school or university
education), the same cannot be said for the second generation (indeed this last category
is Italian mother tongue, always living and educated in the country).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), to study ethnic discrimination, used different
names distinctly associated with Whites and African Americans. Applicants with White
names needed to send about 10 CVs to get one callback, whereas those with African-
American names had to send around 15 résumés to get one callback, and this 50% gap
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in callback rates is statistically significant. Oreopoulos (2011) applied the same method-
ology in Canada, finding a strong and significant preference for English-sounding
names and Canadian education and experience with respect to foreign ones. Similar
tests conducted in France (Adida et al. 2010) and in Sweden (Arai et al. 2016) led to
the same results. In Italy, one of the first studies in this field was performed by Allasino
et al. (2004), who found that most discrimination cases (26.6%) occurred in the first
step of the hiring process.
Our study adopts an experimental design that extends the work of the abovemen-
tioned authors, introducing the concept of first- and second-generation candidates to
decompose overall discrimination into its statistical and taste-based components.
To understand whether the foreign-born individuals are not doing as well as the home-
born individuals in the labor market, we collected data through an ad hoc constructed
field experiment carried out in Italy in the period between July 2013 and October 2014.
To this extent, we constructed a database sending fictitious CVs to firms advertising
real job openings. We did so matching socio-economic background, educational
qualifications, work experience, and other characteristics of the applicants, in order to
make individuals equivalent in every respect, except for the characteristic which the
researcher is investigating (race and sex), and callback rates obtained by applicants can
be considered a good proxy of job opportunities.
Indeed, keeping equal all the individual’s characteristics, except for gender and
nationality, we can assert that differences in callback rates must necessarily come from
discrimination based on such elements.
The Italian National Institute of Statistics reports that 5 million immigrants were
living in Italy on January 1, 2015 (8.2% of the population). The four major communities
are Romanians (22.6% of all the immigrants), Albanians (9.8%), Moroccans (9.0%), and
Chinese (5.3%) (ISTAT 2015a).
Since we wanted to adapt the experimental design to the Italian situation, in our
study, we included candidates coming from the four abovementioned most common
foreign nationalities of immigrants living in Italy. We decided to use several national-
ities instead of just native and immigrants to evaluate whether visible minority groups
more distant from natives are discriminated against more than other visible less distant
ones (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). Germany was also included, as it is the most
common nationality in Italy among “rich” western countries (ISTAT 2015a) and should
therefore be less discriminated than the candidates coming from poorer and more
culturally distant countries.
Being able to develop effective strategies against ethnic discrimination presupposes a
detailed analysis of the different types of discrimination (statistical or taste-based) and
the subjects involved. “Learning about the ways discrimination affects economic
outcomes has the potential to guide policymaking aimed at reducing disparities and it
can generate new methods for detecting the presence of discrimination” (Guryan and
Charles 2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the “Theoretical background” section,
we provide a short review of the literature. The experimental design is described in the
“Experimental design” section. The “Descriptive results” section shows the descriptive
results, and the “Empirical analysis” section shows the empirical results of our models.
Finally, we conclude our study in the “Conclusions” section.
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Theoretical background
Statistical and taste-based discrimination
The first studies investigating ethnic discrimination in the labor market consisted of audits
made in the USA, where people from different ethnic groups (White, Hispanics, and Afro-
Americans) were asked to apply for job offers and to attend job interviews (Newman 1978;
McIntyre et al. 1980; Heckman and Siegelman 1992; Heckman, 1998; Altonji and Blank, 1999).
Research conducted by the “International Labour Office (ILO)” shows that most of the
discrimination found in hiring process occurred at the starting point of the recruitment
when the candidate’s CV is examined. Riach and Rich (2002) in a comparative study
found significant ethnic discrimination in the initial stage (nearly 90% of the total level of
discrimination) in all the countries examined. For this reason, we decided to analyze the
first step of the hiring process. The idea is that if discrimination is going to occur, it is
easier for firms not to interview a potential employee rather than firing him/her.
Having established the existence of ethnic discrimination in the first stage of the
hiring process, several studies concentrated in evaluating how to split the total amount
of such discrimination within its statistical and taste-based components.
To do so, we decided to adapt the approach conducted by some American studies
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Oreopoulos 2011) to the Italian labor market, build-
ing up an ad hoc field experiment.
In terms of ethnic hierarchies, results of the main studies show several different patterns
depending on the country analyzed. While the discrimination in Austria is highest for Arabs,
followed by Chinese, Indians, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi (Hofer et al. 2013), the results for
Australia show the minimum level of discrimination for Italian immigrants followed by Abori-
gine candidates, Middle Eastern candidates, and Chinese (Booth et al. 2012), and Ireland Asian
immigrants are less discriminated than Germans and Africans (McGinnity and Lunn 2011).
Even if the most discriminated ethnicities depend on the country analyzed and,
consequently, on cultural reasons, results show a clear ethnic hierarchy, which is robust
to differences in skill levels and suggests, in this way, a relevant amount of taste-based
discrimination (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
Concerning European Union, an issue of ethnic discrimination appeared on the
European political agenda. The consequent adoption of two new directives (Directives
2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC) brought to an increase in the level of discrimination,
related to its taste-based component.
Several studies (Kaas and Manger 2012; Schneider et al. 2014; Weichselbaumer 2015)
analyzing Germany show the presence of lower levels of discrimination in this country
than elsewhere. As this country is characterized by CVs requiring more detailed
information which reduce informational asymmetry, the results of a lower level of dis-
crimination reveal a reduced level of the statistical component. Deeply, on the one
hand, these results suggest that statistical discrimination plays a relevant role; on the
other hand, as discrimination is still relevant even if the level of information is huge,
the results reveal a massive amount of taste-based discrimination.
First- and second-generation immigrants: international and Italian context
Some of the studies on this topic used first- and second-generation immigrants to make
a difference between the two reasons for discriminating. Even if not all of them agree
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on how to define first- and second-generation individuals, most of the studies explicitly
mention that they both have been schooled in the country analyzed.
There is no general evidence of a lower discrimination against second-generation
candidates, suggesting the existence of a strong taste-based component. In the
multivariate models, the coefficient for second generation appears to be negative, im-
plying the existence of statistical discrimination (see, e.g., Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016)
for a review of the main literature).
According to Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016) “Second-generation immigrants are thus likely
to be perceived more positively, with generation serving as a signal of civic integration.”
The employment opportunities for children of immigrants are a matter of growing
concern (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath et al. 2008; Thomson and Crul 2007). Even
if they have usually acquired linguistic and competence skills comparable to children of
natives and they have therefore substantial capacity for labor market integration (Alba
and Waters 2011, Midtbøen 2016), they do not often have comparable working oppor-
tunities (Crul et al. 2012; Heath and Cheung 2007; OECD 2010). Second-generation
immigrants face different disadvantages depending on the country in which they live.
In countries such as Austria, Belgium, and Germany, they experience these disadvantages
even after getting employed. In countries such as Britain, Sweden, and Norway, they face
barriers only at the entrance to the labor market (Heath et al. 2008; Hermansen 2013;
Midtbøen 2016).
Looking at Italian labor market, the level of immigrants’ integration still appears to be
very low in terms of employment and qualified occupations (Fullin and Reyneri 2011).
According to the survey on “Integration of the second-generation (ISG)” carried out
by ISTAT in 2015 and involving lower and upper secondary schools, immigrants born
in Italy perform almost the same scores as Italian students, meaning that there is no
significant statistical difference between the two categories. Nowadays, immigration in
this respect appears to be different from old European immigration, not being anymore
poor education of immigrants the main reason for their higher difficulties in finding a
job. Indeed, they do not find challenging difficulties in accessing unskilled and semi--
skilled manual jobs, as they experience in self-employment and non-manual jobs (Fullin
and Reyneri 2011).
Moreover, teachers declared in general a good level of integration of foreign students,
who feel to be Italian citizens often more than citizens of their country of origin.
Moreover, in our sample, Italian and immigrant candidates are identical in every
respect because their CVs contain equivalent information. Consequently, whatever is
the mean statistical performance of the categories, in our experiment, Italian and
immigrant candidates are identical.
Furthermore, “not to be Italian born represents a huge difficulty in finding a job in
Italy (especially an appropriate one) for 36.2% of foreigners and 22% Italian naturalized”
(ISTAT 2015b). The sample collected by ISTAT belongs to Quarterly Labour Force
Survey, and the results of the analysis locate in poor knowledge of Italian language, in
the non-recognition of qualifications from abroad and in socio-cultural reasons the
main difficulties to enter the labor market. On the one hand, this analysis considered
the point of view of immigrants or naturalized and their subjective perception about
the reasons determining difficulties in obtaining a job. On the other hand, it tells us
nothing concerning the real motivations underlying firm’s hiring choices. For this
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reason, instead of analyzing immigrants’ perception, we preferred to look at the firm’s
behavior and, indirectly, at the reasons motivating their choice not to hire foreigners
and naturalized candidates.
Double segregation: international and Italian context
We also include gender in our analysis, taking into consideration gender differences
concerning each ethnicity separately. Women are, on average, less likely to be employed
than men, and important differences persist between men and women in the labor
market (Boeri et al. 2005). The connected discrimination also exists when we deal with
immigrants, often becoming, in that case, even more pronounced (Altonji and Blank
1999). This kind of discrimination is referred as by literature in terms of double
discrimination: women are indeed discriminated twice, both because they are women
and immigrants (Boyd 1975).
In terms of double discrimination in the Italian labor market between migrant men and
women and to the ethnic wage gap between Italian and migrant women, Piazzalunga
(2015) found that the second is much larger than the first one, confirming that immigrant
women face a double discrimination based on both ethnicity and gender.
Experimental design
For this study, we collected data through a field experiment carried out in Italy in the
period between July 2013 and October 2014. During that period, we sent 22,000
fictitious résumés, answering to 1000 real online job postings. A large sample size like
this permits us to have a sufficient statistical power to investigate not only the differ-
ence between Italians and immigrants (of first and second generation) but also different
ethnic groups. We implemented empirical evidence, such as Booth et al. (2012), using
at the same time different ethnicities and first- and second-generation.
To control the characteristics of the CVs, we produced fictitious résumés based on
the European Europass format and structure creating the identities as follows: one Ital-
ian man, five first-generation immigrant men, five second-generation immigrant men,
one Italian woman, five first-generation immigrant women, and five second-generation
immigrant women. Immigrants were equally distributed and came from Romania,
Albania, Morocco, People’s Republic of China, and Germany.
Among these nationalities, Germans and Romanians are European Union citizens,
who do not need a visa to live and work in Italy. Albania and Romania are usually
considered very similar nations since they have many commercial contacts with Italy
and they were socialist republics until the 1990s. For this reason, their comparison is
useful to show whether being part of the European Union makes a significant
difference in the probability of being hired.
For each offer, identities are constructed with equivalent skills (i.e., in terms of the level
of education and working experience) and information, to be perfectly comparable differ-
ing only by name, surname, gender, city of birth, postal address, and e-mail address.
Each identity was assigned its own name, surname, gender, city of birth, postal
address in Rome city center, and e-mail address. About physical features, we chose not
to include any pictures in the résumés to avoid further discrimination based on the
candidates’ appearance; in this way, employers do not have any information about skin
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color and physical distance from Western features in advance, being only able to make
subjective assumptions. Moreover, we did not include any telephone numbers, as we
did not have real respondents able to answer the calls.
The search engines from which the job offers were extracted are subito, monster,
kijiji, miojob, combinazioni s.r.l., free work, lavoro.corriere, job365, and vivastreet.
According to the position in Google search results, these are the most used job search
engines in Italy.
Unlike the procedure applied by Rooth (2009), we did not change associations
between names, nationalities, and institutions attended in our experiment. Thus, we
maintained credibility in the application, since we could not exclude that the same
vacancy was present in several of the web search engines posting job offers. Moreover,
in order to reduce the probability of applying to the same job offer more than once,
following the methodology used in studies such as Pager et al. (2009), we drew job
offers from the main search engines, taking a simple random sample of advertisements
each week. In this way, even if we want to admit the possibility of some kind of distor-
tion, produced by applying for the same firm more than once, it will not affect the
preference for different candidates.1
We used the most common names for each nationality to minimize the concerning
bias, avoiding in this way misattribution to other ethnic groups, or connotations of
class or socio-economic status (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
In terms of years, different candidates to the same offer all have the same age. Deeply,
they are all 19 years old if the offer requires a high school diploma, 24 if it requires
graduation, and one additional year for each year of working experience required by
the offer. This methodology ensures that perceived productivity characteristics on the
supply side are held constant.
All the candidates specified their language knowledge according to the Common
European Framework of Reference for Languages, which is the standard evaluation
method in the Europass CV format that we used. All the first-generation candidates
specified their country’s language as mother tongue, a C2 (highest level) knowledge of
Italian, and knowledge of other languages according to the job offer’s requirements.
Second-generation candidates specified Italian as their mother tongue and a B2 (post-
intermediate level) knowledge of their country’s language; in this case as well, other
languages were added according to job offers’ requirements. Italians, on the other hand,
specified in their résumés to have Italian as their mother tongue, while additional
languages were included only when requested by the job announces.
The last characteristics that we considered in the analysis are the qualifications
required, dividing job openings into offers requiring graduation, high school diploma,
and no qualification at all. We chose comparable institutions; while we chose the most
important schools and universities of their own country for first-generation
immigrants, we chose same Italian schools and universities for Italian and second-
generation candidates. Finally, to avoid matching problems and to be competitive with
respect to other applicants, for each different job offer, we added the characteristics,
i.e., education, work experience, language, and computer skills, which completely fulfill
the skills required by the firms to each association already made.
Our design strategy of sending fictitious CVs, which exactly meet the firms’ require-
ments, allowed us to eliminate matching problems as a possible explanation for the
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difference in the rate of response. Moreover, we classified all job openings according to
whether the position involves face-to-face contact with the public. We classified as
front office those job postings which either explicitly stated that the job requires face-
to-face contact with people, or where such contact could be unequivocally inferred
from the job advertisement. Otherwise, the job is classified as back office. We included
in the first category, for instance, jobs belonging to fields like sales and customer
service. By contrast, in the back office category, we decided to include jobs like ac-
counts management, budgeting, industrial engineering, and computer programming. In
this regard, it must be noted that in the last 15 years, an increase in foreign employees
working in contact with the public was observed in Italy (Allasino et al. 2004).
The degree of differential treatment was quantified by using the difference between
groups in the number of callbacks for a job interview. Responses were classified as
callbacks if the employer requested an applicant to contact them (not just for clarifica-
tion) or invited him/her for an interview. To minimize inconvenience to the employer,
invitations were promptly declined as employers who contacted an applicant were
contacted via email and told that the applicant had accepted another position and was
no longer looking for employment.
Descriptive results
After receiving the CVs, firms can react in one of the following ways: both applicants
are invited to an interview, only the majority/native applicant is invited to an interview,
only the minority/immigrant applicant is invited, and none of them are invited. In the
last case, we can consider the no callbacks either as a case of equal treatment, because
all the candidates are treated symmetrically (Cross et al. 1990), or as a non-observation.
In this respect, there are, indeed, many reasons why applicants might be rejected before
the employer even considers their ethnic background (Riach and Rich 2002). Since we
cannot control for the reason why some firms do not answer to any of the candidates,
we decided to follow the second approach that considers the no callback cases as non--
observations (Riach and Rich 2002; Kaas and Manger 2012), restricting the sample to
the ones that have replied to at least one CV (n. 229 companies, subjects 5038). As
stated by Riach and Rich (2002): “There are many reasons why job applicants may be
rejected before an employer has to confront race (or sex). Initial screening may be
based on timing of applications, age, current employment status, etc.” Indeed, we are
concerned to better interpret the real opportunities of the labor market. In this way,
the sample is composed of 458 Italian men and women, 2290 first-generation
immigrants, and 2290 second-generation ones.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables of the total and restricted
sample. It is also stratified by ethnicity and shows the callback rate.
The preliminary descriptive analysis about the total sample (see Fig. 1) shows that a
relevant difference exists in the treatment reserved to Italians compared to immigrants
in the labor market, consistently with the results indicated in the annual report on the
presence of migrants in Italy (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2016). Indeed,
Italian applicants received a much higher proportion of replies than immigrants
(Table 2) also considering the applicants’ gender (Table 3). Analyzing the callback rates
obtained by immigrants more in detail, another difference appears, concerning whether
the candidate is a first- or a second-generation one. Callback rates are lower for first-
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generation immigrants than for second-generation ones. Nevertheless, second-
generation candidates maintain a significant level of discrimination too, compared to
Italians. This result is consistent with the ones shown by Georgiana and Agafiţei
(2016). Even though most second-generation immigrants feel to be Italian citizens in
every respect (in line with “Integration of the second-generation” carried out by ISTAT
2016), they continue to face more difficult conditions in the labor market than their
Italian counterparts (in line with OECD 2014).
The preliminary results of our experiment show the existence of a relevant difference
in the treatment reserved to Italians and immigrants (Table 3). Indeed, while 52% of
Italian applicants received a reply, only 28% of immigrants obtained it. Significant
differences also emerge in terms of gender gap. Generally, female candidates obtain
massively lower callback rates than men. Considering the potential gender gap within
each subgroup (Italian, first-, and second-generation), the table shows that a difference
in callback rate also exists between women and men. Among the female Italian
candidates, only 40% receive a positive response (men 63%), while among first-
generation women, only 18% (30% if men). Finally, among second-generation female
Fig. 1 Callback rates by nationality, generation, and sex
Table 2 Callback rates for the full sample and the restricted sample
Positive responses Full sample Restricted sample
N CVs sent Callback rate (%) N Callback rate (%)
Italian 237 2000 0.12 458 0.52
First generation 539 10,000 0.05 2290 0.24
Second generation 734 10,000 0.07 2290 0.32
The restricted sample is formed by 458 Italian men and women, 2290 first-generation immigrants and 2290
second-generation ones
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immigrants, the percentage of callback is equal to 24% (40% if men). These preliminary
results confirm that, in general, women are the most discriminated category in the
Italian labor market compared to men in each subgroup.
In terms of nationalities, first- and second-generation Moroccan and Chinese are the
most discriminated in our database. This last result is consistent with the main
literature which explains ethnic hierarchy as an indicator of a relevant amount of taste-
based discrimination (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
Moreover, Moroccan candidates, as they come from a Muslim country, could be even
more discriminated for religious reasons connected to Islamophobia.2
Conversely, applicants coming from Germany, both first and second generation, seem
to be the preferred immigrant ethnicity overall. According to Zschirnt and Ruedin
(2016), “taking taste-based discrimination seriously, it can be assumed that more
distant and visible minority groups are discriminated against more than other groups.”
Even if callback rates associated to women are systematically smaller than the ones
associated to men, this result is not surprising considering the strong gender gap char-
acterizing the Italian labor market (Anxo et al. 2011; Campolo and Di Pino 2012;
Busetta and Fiorillo 2016). It is also interesting to note that gender gap between Italians
is often higher than the gap between Italians and immigrants of the same sex. In other
words, discrimination against women with respect to men is higher than discrimination
against immigrants with respect to Italians. For instance, callback rates for Italian
women are lower than the ones obtained by German and Albanian men. This result is
not dissimilar from the one reached by the major literature on this topic. Stereotypes
and media images of immigrants tend to be less relevant within women than men
(Bovenkerk 1992; Andriessen et al. 2012). “This may lead to women being perceived as
better integrated into and less threatening to society than immigrant men, and thus
lower discrimination for women” (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
Even after restricting the sample, callback rates associated to second-generation
immigrants are quite smaller than the ones associated to Italians. This last result shows
that discrimination in the labor market is relevant also for second-generation
immigrants. Splitting immigrants by generation, we conducted our study considering
two potential kinds of discrimination: statistical and taste-based.
Following the most relevant literature on the topic and to investigate this last
relation, we decided to perform a correspondence test to our sample such as in Riach
and Rich (2002) and Drydakis (2009) among others.
Therefore, we calculated the net discrimination between Italian and first-generation
candidates to observe the maximum amount of discrimination reserved to immigrants
(Fig. 2); indeed, we split such a discrimination into the one between Italian and second-
Table 3 Callback rates by ethnicity and gender
Restricted sample Woman Man
N N % N %
Italian 229 92 0.40 145 0.63
First generation 1145 201 0.18 338 0.30
Second generation 1145 271 0.24 463 0.40
In the restricted sample—total Italian candidates = 458; first generation = 2290; second generation = 2290
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generation and the one between second- and first-generation candidates. While the last
discrimination is between two categories which can differ in terms of education and
skills, the same cannot be said for the first one (between Italian and second-generation
candidates). Consequently, while the first case could pertain to statistical discrimin-
ation, the second one must necessarily be taste-based.
In this respect, we followed the results obtained by ISTAT (2016). According to this
study, immigrant students are not systematically less prepared than Italian ones both in
terms of language knowledge and general skills.
Using the correspondence test, two applications sent to real job offers are
similar, except for the single characteristic that is to be tested. In this way, ana-
lyzing callbacks, it is possible to identify unequal treatment based on the unique
different characteristic that, in our case, is the ethnic provenience. In Table 4, we
reported the results of the correspondence test, considering second generation as
minority group and Italians as majority one. For this reason, we calculated call-
back rates by education level (graduate, high school) and contacts with customers
(front office).
Using the correspondence test, we also calculate the net discrimination in callbacks
between first generation and Italians, second generation and Italians, and finally,
between first and second generation by ethnic origin. For lack of brevity, in Fig. 2, we
show the percentage of net discrimination calculated.
As we could imagine, the highest level of discrimination is the one between first-
generation immigrants and Italian candidates. Moreover, results reveal a relevant
discrimination also between first- and second-generation candidates. Both previous
discriminations could be connected to educational and language gaps (statistical
discrimination). The impressive result is the one between second-generation candidates
and Italians. As the two categories are both born and always living and educated in
Italy, this last discrimination can only be derived by reasons connected to racism
(taste-based discrimination).
In this respect (second diagram in Fig. 2), we have observed a level of net discrimin-
ation between second-generation and Italian candidates higher than 30% compared to
Italians for all our categories of ethnicity, except for Germans.
Starting from these preliminary results, we concentrated our analysis on the relation
between taste-based discrimination and education (graduate and high school) and taste-
Fig. 2 Aggregate correspondence test—net discrimination (%) by ethnic origin
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based discrimination and front office, considering the impact of education and the level
of vìs a vìs contact required by the job offer (see Table 4).
The concerning results show that the different education levels required by the job
increase or decrease these net discriminations. In general, we observed that applying
for a job requiring graduation increases the net discrimination for Albanians (from 33
to 34%), Chinese (from 41 to 44%), and Moroccans (from 42 to 48%). Only for
Germans and Romanians we observe a positive effect of the graduation (from 21 to
14% and from 36 to 35%, respectively). The opposite occurs if we consider high school
diploma as the level of education required (Albanians 29%, Chinese 33%, Moroccans
37%, Romanians 31%). For both first- and second-generation German candidates, net
discrimination decreases for jobs requiring a high school diploma, but the associated
decrease is less pronounced in this last case (up to 19%) than in the ones for which
graduation is required (up to 14%). Finally, for jobs entailing contacts with customers,
we can observe that the net discrimination increases for all second-generation immi-
grants (Albanians from 33 to 35%, Chinese from 41 to 47%, Germans from 21 to 22%,
Moroccans from 42 to 45%, Romanians from 36 to 37%).
Empirical analysis
In this section, we analyze the effect of ethnicity on the probability of being called back
for an interview. To capture the effect of discrimination, we estimated this probability
(callback) in different Probit models:
Y i ¼ αþ β1italiani þ β2north−centeri þ β3womani þ β4graduatei þ β5high schooli
þβ6front officei þ εi
ð1Þ
where Y* is the latent variable reflecting the probability of the ith candidate of receiving
a callback from a firm. If Y* > 0, the corresponding observed dummy variable, Y, is equal
to 1 (Callback—yes = 1). If Y* = 0, the corresponding value of the dummy variable, Y, is
equal to 0 (Callback—no = 0). On the right side of the equation, Greek letters refer to
parameters. Namely, α is the constant term, Italian is a dummy variable and it refers to
the ethnicity of the candidate (1 = the candidate is Italian; 0 = otherwise); ε is the
disturbance term.
The main explanatory variables are the firm’s geographical area (north-center—1 =
yes; 0 = otherwise), the sex of the candidate (woman—1 = yes; 0 = man), the education
level required by the firm and specified in the CVs (graduate—1 = yes, 0 = otherwise;
high school—1 = yes, 0 = otherwise; reference—no title), if the job offer requires
contacts with customers (front office—1 = yes, 0 = back office). If β̂1 ¼ 0, Italians and
immigrants had the same probability of obtaining an interview. It means that being an
Italian does not either reduce or increase the probability of obtaining a job interview.
While if β̂1 < 0, immigrants had a higher probability than Italians of obtaining a job
interview; if β̂1 > 0, they had a lower probability than Italians of obtaining it.
The objective of our analysis is to analyze whether discrimination based on ethnic
origin affects candidate’s opportunity of obtaining a job interview in the Italian labor
market. Therefore, for completeness, we replicate our model considering different sub-
samples, estimating four identical Probit models applied to different subsamples. Model
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2 (Italian) contains only observations on the Italian candidates, and in model 3 (immi-
grant), only observations on the immigrant ones. Finally, in the last two models (model
4 and model 5), we split immigrants into two subsamples, first and second generation.
In Table 5, we show the results of our Probit model and the relative marginal effects.
To analyze the probability of obtaining a callback, we first considered a model which
includes all the categories and a dummy variable Italians as regressor (model 1). In the
other models (models 2–5), we considered the subsample of Italians, immigrants, first-,
and second-generation candidates. Model 1 shows that the probability of obtaining a
callback increases if the candidate is Italian. The results of this analysis confirm the
ones reported above. In general, the coefficients maintain same sign and statistical sig-
nificance in all the five models, confirming the robustness of our results. For this rea-
son, we analyzed all the models together. In terms of gender gap, the coefficients
associated to the variable woman reveal a strong level of statistically significant discrim-
ination for both Italian and immigrant women. Gender gap seems to be smaller within
immigrants than within Italians, especially if we compare Italians with first-generation
immigrants. The education level (graduate and high school) plays an important role
(positive and significant coefficients), for all candidates. The interesting result is that
the increase in probability is higher for Italians than for immigrants but becomes not
significant for first-generation immigrants. For this kind of candidate, a higher level of
education does not necessarily involve a greater probability to obtain a job interview.
This result is supported by the main literature on the topic (Heath and Cheung
2007 and, for Italy, Fullin and Reyneri 2011). Therefore, we could argue that the
reason underlying this kind of discrimination concerns the unequal perception of
recruiters about graduation obtained in foreign countries, compared to graduation
obtained in Italy.
If we analyze results concerning jobs requiring contacts with customers (front office),
the associated coefficient is negative and significant for the model including all the im-
migrants and for the one including only first-generation immigrants. This last result in-
dicates statistical discrimination because it seems that firms consider only first-
generation immigrants less skilled, most probably in terms of language knowledge, than
Italians and second-generation candidates.
Finally, the coefficients associated to the firm’s geographical area (north-center) show
that it is easier for immigrants to obtain a job interview if they apply for a firm located
in the north-center, but this result is statistically significant only for the subsample of
first-generation candidates.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to analyze ethnic and gender discrimination in the Italian labor
market, using first- and second-generation candidates to distinguish between statistical
and taste-based discrimination. To do so, we build up an ad hoc created database
sending fictitious CVs to firms advertising real job openings.
We found a first significant discrimination against women which interacts differently
depending on the candidate (Italian, first-, or second-generation immigrant). In this
respect, even if callback rates associated to women are systematically smaller than the
ones associated to men, gender gap between Italians is often higher than the one
between both first- and second-generation immigrants. As we have shown in Table 5,
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Italian women suffer a higher reduction (− 23%) than immigrant women in the
probability of obtaining a job interview compared to their male counterparts. In this
respect, first-generation immigrant women obtain a reduction of 12% compared to their
male counterparts, and second-generation immigrant women obtain a reduction of 17%
with respect to their male counterparts. This first result seems to be particularly relevant,
and we are thinking, for this reason, to use it as starting point for a new research question.
The highest level of discrimination is the one between first-generation immigrants
and Italian candidates. It can be divided into two parts: the one between first- and
second-generation candidates and the one between second-generation and natives.
While the first one is between candidates which are different in terms of professional
skills and level of Italian language knowledge and can therefore be connected to statis-
tical reasons, the second one affects candidates with the same level of professional skills
and language knowledge, and it can only be addressed to taste-based reasons.
Even if results reveal a relevant discrimination also between first- and second-
generation candidates (statistical discrimination), the most remarkable result is the one
between second-generation candidates and Italians; as the two categories are both born,
always living, and educated in Italy, this last discrimination must necessarily be taste-
based, which is always inefficient in terms of overall social welfare.
Starting from these preliminary results, we concentrated our analysis on the relation-
ship between discrimination and education and discrimination and level of vìs a vìs
contact required by the job offer. The interesting result is the following: a higher
education required by the job offer increases the probability of being called back more
for Italians than for immigrants, and this increase completely disappears for first-
generation candidates.
As graduation is to be considered equivalent by law—at least the ones obtained in
the European Union—this last form of discrimination must be a taste-based one. This
result is in line with the one obtained by Fullin and Reyneri (2011). According to the
authors, in Italy, the level of educational attainment is not positively related to the
probability of avoiding unemployment for immigrants of both genders, because foreign
qualifications may not be sufficiently recognized by the receiving country. For this
reason, it appears to be very important to promote a culture of integration versus the
countries of origin of the main immigrants living in Italy.
If we analyze results concerning jobs requiring contacts with customers (front office),
the associated coefficient is negative and significant for first-generation immigrants
(but not for second-generation ones) meaning that for this kind of jobs, discrimination
is mainly devoted to first-generation immigrants, most probably for statistical reasons
(gaps in language knowledge and in professional skills).
Being able to develop effective strategies against ethnic discrimination presup-
poses a detailed analysis of the different types of discrimination (statistical or taste-
based) and the subjects involved. In fact, policy implications are completely differ-
ent depending on which of the two kinds of discrimination prevails. In the case of
statistical discrimination, the solution in terms of policy would be to reduce asym-
metric information (e.g., improving knowledge about foreign skills, education, and
institutions), while in the case of taste-based discrimination, it would be to in-
crease the culture of integration (e.g., intervention in schools and voluntary
associations).
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Despite the empirical evidence of the difference in treatment between natives and
immigrants in the Italian labor market, Italy has not either a coherent immigration
policy or an inclusive insertion policy (Schierup et al. 2006). Indeed, the main interest
of policymakers appears to be driven by political interests rather than economical ones.
For this reason, they are more concentrated on trying to avoid unauthorized entries
than on the integration of immigrants (Zincone 2006). As also highlighted by Piazzalunga
(2015), even though Italian and immigrant workers have the same social rights, no
national policy tries to promote their economic and social integration.
Endnotes
1Search engines do not make any selection of the candidates, acting just as a
repository for the CVs. Moreover, in several of the job postings analyzed, there is no
information on the single firm offering vacancies because the search engine hid this
information.
2In the last years, we are experiencing a sort of “Islamophobia” in Europe—discrimination
towards Muslim people increased following September 11th, 2001 events (Sheridan
2006)—and has risen even more in the very last years, due to terrorist activities conducted
by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), often also referred to as “ISIS,” and the
consequent shift in people’s view of Islam (Pargeter 2015; Fujimura 2016). A test conducted
in France indicated that Muslim candidates are 2.5 times less likely to receive a callback
than their Christian counterparts (Adida et al. 2010). The presence of Moroccans in our
study can reveal whether being part of a Muslim country leads to a stronger discrimination.
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